Kissinger's Betrayal by Stephen B. Young

Author:Stephen B. Young
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Amplify Publishing Group
Published: 2023-02-08T00:00:00+00:00

Chapter 7

The Betrayal Is Consummated

Things are in the saddle

and ride mankind.

—Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Ode, Inscribed to William H. Channing”

Henry Kissinger came to Saigon to inform South Vietnam’s leaders of the terms of peace with their Communist enemy that he had just reached on their behalf. It was not Kissinger’s intention to give Nguyen Van Thieu and his colleagues any significant role in determining how the United States would end its participation in the war to defend South Vietnam.1

Ellsworth Bunker, however, retained admiration, even some affection, for Kissinger. In a world where many spoke airily with ease and where even more lacked both convictions and courage, Bunker looked upon Kissinger as a man who used power well. Bunker judged others by the results of their undertakings. Kissinger’s intensity and quick mind were always focused on getting what he wanted. Bunker felt his spirits rise in Kissinger’s dynamic presence. With so many others acting from minimalist or even defeatist expectations, Bunker found Kissinger’s vitality a refreshing alternative.

Bunker’s South Vietnamese counterparts had no illusions about Kissinger. What Thieu had always feared most—that Washington would permit North Vietnamese troops to stay in South Vietnam—was now a reality. Accordingly, Thieu and his associates felt keenly that the American national security advisor had willfully betrayed them. They were understandably angry and bitter over this. In their minds, his peace agreement was nothing to celebrate. It was, from their point of view, a fatuous piece of worthless paper, only a photo opportunity, boosting him up personally to strut about on the world stage indulging in great intellectual condescension at their great expense.

Thieu had also not been consulted as promised before Kissinger had reached this understanding with Hanoi. Thieu had told the Americans that they were on their own in the negotiations, and Kissinger had gone ahead on his own without Thieu’s consent. What could the South Vietnamese do now to protect themselves? They could not alienate the Americans, but they didn’t want to accept Kissinger’s terms for a temporary truce in their war with Hanoi, a truce that left Hanoi with impressive strategic advantages.

The reality was that Kissinger could easily have consulted with Thieu and even sought specific guidance from President Nixon after October 8, when Le Duc Tho had presented new and conciliatory proposals in Paris. Then, there had been time for Kissinger to ask for an adjournment of the negotiations to confirm that his president really wanted a peace agreement on such terms and to give Thieu a meaningful say in the negotiations.

Having negotiated only a “decent interval” for South Vietnam, Kissinger now found himself very much on the defensive. He now proceeded to maneuver to extend the interval of “decency” that Hanoi might provide for the Nationalists to be free of Communist dictatorship. He was caught between Hanoi and Saigon. He had to gain concessions from Hanoi to give more length to the “interval” while convincing the South Vietnamese that the interval he was providing for them to live freely according to their nationalist values would last and last.

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